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<\/figure><\/div>\n\n\n\n\nThe\nresistance and adaptability typical of the Chinese character towards\nthe invader is still present, and we have witnessed the\ntransformation of a society that in 1984 was fundamentally\nagricultural (40% of its GDP), and that just 35 years later dominates\nthe technological world scenario with to the United States as well,\nleading the deployment of 5G by the hand of Huawei. Such achievement\nhas occurred not only in terms of competitiveness, but also by making\nits technology an intrinsic part of its legacy and by putting\ntechnological development at the service of the national interest.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\nAs\nthe comparison mentioned by the former head of the Canadian\nIntelligence and Security Service for Asia-Pacific, Michel\nJuneau-Katsua, if Western intelligence had to steal a beach, he would\ngo at night and wait for nobody to see him to steal it. On the other\nhand, if Chinese intelligence had to do it, it would send a thousand\ntourists and on the way back they would shake their towels, day by\nday.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\nHiding\nin broad daylight is a concept associated with Eastern culture,\nbecause, even leaving aside large corporations such as Xiaomi or\nHuawei and the obvious possibility of controlling “their”\ndevices, they have managed to install software of all kind on any\ncomputer on the planet. It is not uncommon to find binaries with\nMandarin language resources or drivers signed by Chinese companies,\nwhich could potentially facilitate a campaign directed against any\norganization.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\nWe\nalso have the issue of electronic devices, the global massive sale\nwhich has allowed the worldwide deployment of a potentially\nvulnerable network of video surveillance cameras, loudspeakers or\nsmartbands. Meanwhile, it competes with Google and Amazon for the\ncontrol of the information at home.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
However, China is not interested in entering the Thucydides trap through a direct confrontation against the United States, but will use, as it has done in the past, the multipolar geopolitical scenario to achieve its purposes.
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If you use the enemy to defeat the enemy, you will be powerful wherever you go.<\/em> \nAbout\nto end the Korean War, Mao managed to gain a foothold on the\ninternational scene through a strategy very much in the line with the\nclassic strategist Sun Tzu. In a world in which two great\nsuperpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, fought for world\nhegemony, he managed to see them as equals.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \nIt\nfaced the United States in the Taiwan Strait conflict and, almost at\nthe same time, ideologically and geopolitically dissociated itself\nfrom the communist bloc. This position was based on the fact that\nnone of the powers would allow the launching of nuclear weapons on\nMandarin territory, and the maintenance of a public position that\nclaimed to have no fear of such weapons. As Mao himself stated,\n\u201cChina has 600 million inhabitants in an area of \u200b\u200b9.6 million\nsquare kilometers. The United States cannot annihilate China with a\nsimple pile of atomic bombs. “<\/p>\n\n\n\n \nExercising\nan active position, Mao ended up being part of the international\nbalance with an independent voice, exerting psychological pressure on\nboth sides through the conflicts in the Taiwan Strait and his\nintervention in the Vietnam War.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \nThe\ncurrent world offers very good opportunities for these puppeteer\nperformances, as the attribution of a hostile act in cyberspace is\ntruly complex, as evidenced by the false flag operation reported by\nKaspersky on OlympicDestroyer. During the 2018 South Korea Winter\nOlympics, the OlympicDestroyer malware paralyzed IT systems, caused\noutages, and brought down the organization’s websites.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \nWhat\nis relevant about these actions is that, as detailed in the report,\nthe tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) were those commonly used\nby the Lazarous group, associated with North Korea. However,\neverything indicated that intentional errors had been made in order\nto facilitate the detection of such TTPs, stirring the international\nstage with a campaign with mediatic overtones. This makes more sense\nif we take into account that in February 2018 North Korea was\nsurrounded by sanctions derived from its nuclear plan, specifically\nresolutions 2371, 2375 and 2397 adopted in 2017, which fundamentally\ndamaged its relationship with China.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \nLooking\nto the future, everything indicates that China will continue to bet\non conflict resolution through operations in cyberspace, limiting its\nmilitary interventions to what is strictly necessary or for\npropaganda purposes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \nThe\nconflict in cyberspace allows, to a certain extent, to abandon\nClausewitz’s theses and the understanding of confrontation as battles\nthat begin and end, and where the enemies are defined and tangible\nunits. The new era embraces Suntzunian theses, promoting flexibility\nin battle or the use of time as a weapon, concepts that are rather\nforeign to Western tradition.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \nWhile\ntradition in the West has fostered heroism and the coup in the\ndecisive moment, Chinese ideals are based on patience, subtle harm\nand the accumulation of advantages in a gradual way, concepts that\nmatches perfectly in a conflict in Internet.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Thus, China is comfortable with the new approach to the multinational conflict, a world whose rules play in favor of concealment, indefiniteness and confusion. Actually, its rules. References <\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n\n\n\n https:\/\/www.fireeye.com\/blog\/threat-research\/2013\/02\/mandiant-exposes-apt1-chinas-cyber-espionage-units.html<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n
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